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Showing posts with label Academics. Show all posts

Tuesday 10 May 2016

The Doctrine Of Atonement

14:19:00



THE priestly work of Christ, or at least that part of it in which He offered Himself up as a sacrifice to satisfy divine justice and reconcile us to God, is commonly called the atonement, and the doctrine which sets it forth is commonly called the doctrine of the atonement. That doctrine is at the very heart of what is taught in the Word of God.

Before we present that doctrine, we ought to observe that the term by which it is ordinarily designated is not altogether free from objection.

When I say that the term ‘atonement’ is open to objection, I am not referring to the fact that it occurs only once in the King James Version of the New Testament, and is therefore, so far as New Testament usage is concerned, not a common Biblical term. A good many other terms which are rare in the Bible are nevertheless admirable terms when one comes to summarise Biblical teaching. As a matter of fact this term is rather common in the Old Testament (though it occurs only that once in the New Testament), but that fact would not be necessary to commend it if it were satisfactory in other ways. Even if it were not common in either Testament it still might be exactly the term for us to use to designate by one word what the Bible teaches in a number of words.

The real objection to it is of an entirely different kind. It is a twofold objection. The word atonement in the first place, is ambiguous, and in the second place, it is not broad enough.

The one place where the word occurs in the King James Version of the New Testament is Romans 5:11, where Paul says:


And not only so, but we also joy in God through our Lord Jesus Christ, by whom we have now received the atonement.

Here the word is used to translate a Greek word meaning ‘reconciliation.’ This usage seems to be very close to the etymological meaning of the word, for it does seem to be true that the English word ‘atonement’ means ‘atonement.’ It is, therefore, according to its derivation, a natural word to designate the state of reconciliation between two parties formerly at variance.

In the Old Testament, on the other hand, where the word occurs in the King James Version not once, but forty or fifty times, it has a different meaning; it has the meaning of ‘propitiation.’ Thus we read in Leviticus 1:4, regarding a man who brings a bullock to be killed as a burnt offering:


And he shall put his hand upon the head of the burnt offering; and it shall be accepted for him to make atonement for him.

So also the word occurs some eight times in the King James Version in the sixteenth chapter of Leviticus, where the provisions of the law are set forth regarding the great day of atonement. Take, for example, the following verses in that chapter:


And Aaron shall offer his bullock of the sin offering, which is for himself, and make an atonement for himself, and for his house (Lev. 16:6).

Then shall he kill the goat of the sin offering that is for the people, and bring his blood within the veil, and do with that blood as he did with the blood of the bullock, and sprinkle it upon the mercy seat:

And he shall make atonement for the holy place, because of the uncleanness of the children of Israel, and because of their transgressions in all their sins: and so shall he do for the tabernacle of the congregation, that remaineth among them in the midst of their uncleanness (Lev. 16:15f.).

In these passages the meaning of the word is clear. God has been offended because of the sins of the people or of individuals among His people. The priest kills the animal which is brought as a sacrifice. God is thereby propitiated, and those who have offended God are forgiven.

I am not now asking whether those Old Testament sacrifices brought forgiveness in themselves, or merely as prophecies of a greater sacrifice to come; I am not now considering the significant limitations which the Old Testament law attributes to their efficacy. We shall try to deal with those matters in some subsequent talk. All that I am here interested in is the use of the word ‘atonement’ in the English Bible. All that I am saying is that that word in the Old Testament clearly conveys the notion of something that is done to satisfy God in order that the sins of men may be forgiven and their communion with God restored.

Somewhat akin to this Old Testament use of the word ‘atonement’ is the use of it in our everyday parlance where religion is not at all in view. Thus we often say that someone in his youth was guilty of a grievous fault but has fully ‘atoned’ for it or made full ‘atonement’ for it by a long and useful life. We mean by that that the person in question has — if we may use a colloquial phrase — ‘made up for’ his youthful indiscretion by his subsequent life of usefulness and rectitude. Mind you, I am not at all saying that a man can really ‘make up for’ or ‘atone for’ a youthful sin by a subsequent life of usefulness and rectitude; but I am just saying that that indicates the way in which the English word is used. In our ordinary usage the word certainly conveys the idea of something like compensation for some wrong that has been done.

It certainly conveys that notion also in those Old Testament passages. Of course that is not the only notion that it conveys in those passages. There the use of the word is very much more specific. The compensation which is indicated by the word is a compensation rendered to God, and it is a compensation that has become necessary because of an offence committed against God. Still, the notion of compensation or satisfaction is clearly in the word. God is offended because of sin; satisfaction is made to Him in some way by the sacrifice; and so His favour is restored.

Thus in the English Bible the word ‘atonement’ is used in two rather distinct senses. In its one occurrence in the New Testament it designates the particular means by which such reconciliation is effected — namely, the sacrifice which God is pleased to accept in order that man may again be received into favour.

Now of these two uses of the word it is unquestionably the Old Testament use which is followed when we speak of the ‘doctrine of the atonement.’ We mean by the word, when we thus use it in theology, not the reconciliation between God and man, not the ‘at-onement’ between God and man, but specifically the means by which that reconciliation is effected — namely, the death of Christ as something that was necessary in order that sinful man might be received into communion with God.

I do not see any great objection to the use of the word in that way — provided only that we are perfectly clear that we are using it in that way. Certainly it has acquired too firm a place in Christian theology and has gathered around it too many precious associations for us to think, now, of trying to dislodge it.

However, there is another word which would in itself have been much better, and it is really a great pity that it has not come into more general use in this connection. That is the word ‘satisfaction.’ If we only had acquired the habit of saying that Christ made full satisfaction to God for man that would have conveyed a more adequate account of Christ’s priestly work as our Redeemer than the word ‘atonement’ can convey. It designates what the word ‘atonement’ — rightly understood — designates, and it also designates something more. We shall see what that something more is in a subsequent talk.

But it is time now for us to enter definitely into our great subject. Men were estranged from God by sin; Christ as their great high priest has brought them back into communion with God. How has He done so? That is the question with which we shall be dealing in a number of the talks that now follow.

This afternoon all that I can do is to try to state the Scripture doctrine in bare summary (or begin to state it), leaving it to subsequent talks to show how that Scripture doctrine is actually taught in the Scriptures, to defend it against objections, and to distinguish it clearly from various unscriptural theories.

What then in bare outline does the Bible teach about the ‘atonement’? What does it teach — to use a better term — about the satisfaction which Christ presented to God in order that sinful man might be received into God’s favour?

I cannot possibly answer this question even in bare summary unless I call your attention to the Biblical doctrine of sin with which we dealt last winter. You cannot possibly understand what the Bible says about salvation unless you understand what the Bible says about the thing from which we are saved.

If then we ask what is the Biblical doctrine of sin, we observe, in the first place, that according to the Bible all men are sinners.

Well, then, that being so, it becomes important to ask what this sin is which has affected all mankind. Is it just an excusable imperfection; is it something that can be transcended as a man can transcend the immaturity of his youthful years? Or, supposing it to be more than imperfection, supposing it to be something like a definite stain, is it a stain that can easily be removed as writing is erased from a slate?

The Bible leaves us in no doubt as to the answer to these questions. Sin, it tells us, is disobedience to the law of God, and the law of God is entirely irrevocable.

The Doctrine Of Atonement 



Why is the law of God irrevocable? The Bible makes that plain. Because it is rooted in the nature of God! God is righteous and that is the reason why His law is righteous. Can He then revoke His law or allow it to be disregarded? Well, there is of course no external compulsion upon Him to prevent Him from doing these things. There is none who can say to Him, ‘What doest thou?’ In that sense He can do all things. But the point is, He cannot revoke His law and still remain God. He cannot, without Himself becoming unrighteous, make His law either forbid righteousness or condone unrighteousness. When the law of God says, ‘The soul that sinneth it shall die,’ that awful penalty of death is, indeed, imposed by God’s will; but God’s will is determined by God’s nature, and God’s nature being unchangeably holy the penalty must run its course. God would be untrue to Himself, in other words, if sin were not punished; and that God should be untrue to Himself is the most impossible thing that can possibly be conceived.

Under that majestic law of God man was placed in the estate wherein he was created. Man was placed in a probation, which theologians call the covenant of works. If he obeyed the law during a certain limited period, his probation was to be over; he would be given eternal life without any further possibility of loss. If, on the other hand, he disobeyed the law, he would have death — physical death and eternal death in hell.

Man entered into that probation with every advantage. He was created in knowledge, righteousness and holiness. He was created not merely neutral with respect to goodness; he was created positively good. Yet he fell. He failed to make his goodness an assured and eternal goodness; he failed to progress from the goodness of innocency to the confirmed goodness which would have been the reward for standing the test. He transgressed the commandment of God, and so came under the awful curse of the law.

Under that curse came all mankind. That covenant of works had been made with the first man, Adam, not only for himself but for his posterity. He had stood, in that probation, in a representative capacity; he had stood — to use a better terminology — as the federal head of the race, having been made the federal head of the race by divine appointment. If he had successfully met the test, all mankind descended from him would have been born in a state of confirmed righteousness and blessedness, without any possibility of falling into sin or of losing eternal life. But as a matter of fact Adam did not successfully meet the test. He transgressed the commandment of God, and since he was the federal head, the divinely appointed representative of the race, all mankind sinned in him and fell with him in his first transgression.

Thus all mankind, descended from Adam by ordinary generation, are themselves under the dreadful penalty of the law of God. They are under that penalty at birth, before they have done anything either good or bad. Part of that penalty is the want of the righteousness with which man was created, and a dreadful corruption which is called original sin. Proceeding from that corruption when men grow to years of discretion come individual acts of transgression.

Can the penalty of sin resting upon all mankind be remitted? Plainly not, if God is to remain God. That penalty of sin was ordained in the law of God, and the law of God was no mere arbitrary and changeable arrangement but an expression of the nature of God Himself. If the penalty of sin were remitted, God would become unrighteous, and that God will not become unrighteous is the most certain thing that can possibly be conceived.

How then can sinful men be saved? In one way only. Only if a substitute is provided who shall pay for them the just penalty of God’s law.

The Bible teaches that such a substitute has as a matter of fact been provided. The substitute is Jesus Christ. The law’s demands of penalty must be satisfied. There is no escaping that. But Jesus Christ satisfied those demands for us when He died instead of us on the cross.

I have used the word ‘satisfied’ advisedly. It is very important for us to observe that when Jesus died upon the cross He made a full satisfaction for our sins; He paid the penalty which the law pronounces upon our sin, not in part but in full.

In saying that, there are several misunderstandings which need to be guarded against in the most careful possible way. Only by distinguishing the Scripture doctrine carefully from several distortions of it can we understand clearly what the Scripture doctrine is. I want to point out, therefore, several things that we do not mean when we say that Christ paid the penalty of our sin by dying instead of us on the cross.

In the first place, we do not mean that when Christ took our place He became Himself a sinner. Of course He did not become a sinner. Never was His glorious righteousness and goodness more wonderfully seen than when He bore the curse of God’s law upon the cross. He was not deserving of that curse. Far from it! He was deserving of all praise.

What we mean, therefore, when we say that Christ bore our guilt is not that He became guilty, but that He paid the penalty that we so richly deserved.

In the second place, we do not mean that Christ’s sufferings were the same as the sufferings that we should have endured if we had paid the penalty of our own sins. Obviously they were not the same. Part of the sufferings that we should have endured would have been the dreadful suffering of remorse. Christ did not endure that suffering, for He had done no wrong. Moreover, our sufferings would have endured to all eternity, whereas Christ’s sufferings on the cross endured but a few hours. Plainly then His sufferings were not the same as ours would have been.

In the third place, however, an opposite error must also be warded off. If Christ’s sufferings were not the same as ours, it is also quite untrue to say that He paid only a part of the penalty that was due to us because of our sin. Some theologians have fallen into that error. When man incurred the penalty of the law, they have said, God was pleased to take some other and lesser thing — namely, the sufferings of Christ on the cross — instead of exacting the full penalty. Thus, according to these theologians, the demands of the law were not really satisfied by the death of Christ, but God was simply pleased, in arbitrary fashion, to accept something less than full satisfaction.

That is a very serious error indeed. Instead of falling into it we shall, if we are true to the Scriptures, insist that Christ on the cross paid the full and just penalty for our sin.

The error arose because of a confusion between the payment of a debt and the payment of a penalty. In the case of a debt it does not make any difference who pays; all that is essential is that the creditor shall receive what is owed him. What is essential is that just the same thing shall be paid as that which stood in the bond.

But in the case of the payment of a penalty it does make a difference who pays. The law demanded that we should suffer eternal death because of our sin. Christ paid the penalty of the law in our stead. But for Him to suffer was not the same as for us to suffer. He is God, and not merely man. Therefore if He had suffered to all eternity as we should have suffered, that would not have been to pay the just penalty of the sin, but it would have been an unjust exaction of vastly more. In other words, we must get rid of merely quantitative notions in thinking of the sufferings of Christ. What He suffered on the cross was what the law of God truly demanded not of any person but of such a person as Himself when He became our substitute in paying the penalty of sin. He did therefore make full and not merely partial satisfaction for the claims of the law against us.

Finally, it is very important to observe that the Bible’s teaching about the cross of Christ does not mean that God waited for someone else to pay the penalty of sin before He would forgive the sinner. So unbelievers constantly represent it, but that representation is radically wrong. No, God Himself paid the penalty of sin — God Himself in the Person of God the Son, who loved us and gave Himself for us, God Himself in the person of God the Father who so loved the world as to give His only-begotten Son, God the Holy Spirit who applies to us the benefits of Christ’s death. God’s the cost and ours the marvellous gain! Who shall measure the depths of the love of God which was extended to us sinners when the Lord Jesus took our place and died in our stead upon the accursed tree?

Author
John Gresham Machen was one of the most colorful and controversial figures of his time, and it is doubtful that in the ecclesiastical world of the twenties and thirties any religious teacher was more constantly in the limelight. Machen was a scholar, Professor at Princeton and Westminster Seminaries, church leader, apologist for biblical Christianity, and one of the most eloquent defenders of the faith in the twentieth century. He went home to be with the Lord on January 1, 1937.

What Is Religion?

05:34:00
The quest to define religion has pre-occupied both scholars and non-scholars for many centuries. Despite all these efforts, however, it has proved extremely difficult to come up with a definition of religion that is true for all the people in all the places at all times. Definitions that have been put forward have always been seen to contain certain deficiencies by others and the counter definitions have suffered from this same fate as well. 

For instance Hopfe (1987:2) contends that definitions that have been proffered do indicate elements that are common in many religions but no single definition “can do justice to them all”. Such Examples of definitions include John Ferguson’s collection of seventeen definitions which have been summarised into five broad categories of theological, sociological, moral, psychological and philosophical definitions (Cox 1992:3-8). This paper seeks to explore the reasons why it has proved difficult to define religion despite the spirited efforts of various scholars and non-scholars alike from time immemorial.

What Is Religion?

Much of the discussion in this paper will heavily rely on Hall, Pilgrim and Cavanagh, the three American scholars who outlined five problems associated with defining religion. These problems were that most of the definitions suffered from one of the following deficiencies (1) vagueness; (2) narrowness; (3) compartmentalization; and (4) prejudice. Barnhart also added his voice to this scholarly discourse and weighed in with another approach to identifying problems of defining religion in which he exposed the shortcomings of the traditional definitions of religion of his time. He identified five of these, namely, the problems of: (1) Belief in the supernatural; (2) evaluative definitions; (3) Diluted Definitions; (4) Expanded Definitions; and (5) true religion. Some of these issues or problems in defining religion as identified by Barnhart do correspond to what Hall, Pilgrim and Cavanagh discussed in their approach.

This paper will therefore seek to discuss the Hall, Pilgrim and Cavanagh in juxtaposition with Barnhart’s findings. The two approaches are not in conflict but do complement and reinforce each other. This is how the two approaches are related; the problem of (1) vagueness will be equivalent to that of diluted definitions; (2) narrowness will be equivalent to belief in the supernatural; (3) compartmentalization will be akin to expanded definitions; (4) prejudice will be equivalent to evaluative definitions; and (5) Barnhart’s problem of true religion finds no equivalence in the Hall, Pilgrim and Cavanagh method.

Vagueness of definitions is problematic in our attempt to define religion. They take too much from other fields of study to such an extent that the subject matter of religion is not at all discussed. This problem as identified by Hall, Pilgrim and Cavanagh will be equivalent to the diluted definitions problem of Barnhart. Again, the definition carries almost everything with it to the extent that its original intention of defining religion gets diluted. An example from Ferguson’s list of definitions will be Religion is the ultimate concern by Paul Tillichi. This definition scarcely tells us what the “ultimate concern” is all about; hence it will be difficult to understand religion from it.

Secondly, in an attempt to run from vagueness, most definitions will be found guilty of narrowness according to Hall, Pilgrim and Cavanagh. This problem is akin to Barnhart’s problem of belief in the supernatural. These definitions limit the religion by defining it to the exclusion of other religions. Most definitions classified as theological definitions will be guilty of this accusation. An example will be the general belief that religion has to do with God (= Theos which is the Greek word and root word for theology). This according to Cox (1992:9) will exclude “non-theistic or polytheistic forms of religion”.

Compartmentalization is yet another critical shortcoming that most definitions will suffer from. This is when religion is defined in terms of one aspect of it in a way that assumes that the single aspect constitutes the whole or our total understanding of religion. For instance, to equate religion, as Alfred Norton Whitehead does, to “what a man does with his solitariness” is to commit the crime of compartmentalization. Whereas most forms of religion will have an aspect of human “solitariness” much of religion is played in the public domain and “in the company” of or in “fellowship” with others. This will relate to Barnhart’s expanded definitions where one single component of religion is expanded so that it excludes other components.

Further, looking at Ferguson’s seventeen definitions, one cannot help but note with concern, as Hall, Pilgrim and Cavanagh do, the existence of the problem of prejudice. This will be equivalent to Barnhart’s evaluative definitions. One of the biggest problems, especially committed by those who are outside the religious experience is to judge on their terms what they observe. Such normally do not seek to understand that particular form of religion or religion in general from those who practicing it or most affected by it. So such definitions do not shed light on the meaning of religion but do judge or evaluate religion, hence evaluative definitions. It passes judgment on religion based on the person’s biases or prejudices. An example of such will be Karl Marx’s definition which alleges that “Religion is the opium of the people”. This seems to dismiss all religious experience as an attempt to seek refuge in falsehood or temporary relief measures akin to what drug users will do with drugs. Such is a key problem in defining religion hence the difficulty in coming up with a universally accepted definition.

Barnhart goes further than Hall, Pilgrim and Cavanagh to identify yet another problematic issue in defining religion. He calls it the problem of true religion.
Hall, Pilgrim and Cavanagh would call these definitions prejudiced but Barnhart’s additional category clarifies that prejudice need not result just from an evaluation against religion… but also may include claims of truth or revelation from within a religion itself.
Cox (1994:10)

Definitions exhibiting such tendencies will include (1) “There is no God but Allah and Muhammad is his prophet” and (2) Religion is belief in Jesus”. What these definitions do is that while they judge other religions (presumably labeling them false) they make “claims of truth from within” (Cox: 10). But truly this does not sufficiently define religion!

The above discussion clearly outlines points of difficulty in coming up with a universally accepted definition of religion which true for all people in all places at any given time. Even if we assumed it “… is many things, many different things” (Bourdillon 1990:3), we do not eliminate the difficulties associated with defining it. Such problems as outlined above, do impact on the objectivity of the one trying to define the phenomenon because they do bring consciously or unconsciously their own subject biases into the whole process hence leading to evaluation, compartmentalization, narrowness and vagueness in the definitions. Some even result in arrogant claims of religious superiority over other religions by laying claim to superior revelation from within a religion itself.


REFERENCE LIST
Bettis, JD 1969. Phenomenology of Religion- Eight Modern Descriptions of the Essence of Religion. New York: Harper & Row

Bourdillon, MFC1990. Religion and Society- A Text for Africa. Gweru: Mambo Press.

Cox, JL 1992. Expressing the Sacred- An Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion. Harare: University of Zimbabwe Publication.

Connolly, P 1999. Approaches to the Study of Religion. New York: Cassell.

Hopfe, 1987. LM Religions of the World 4th ed. New York: Macmillan Publishing Company